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Abstract
No. And not only for the reason you think. In a world with multiple ineffi-
ciencies the single policy tool the central bank has control over will not undo
all inefficiencies; this is well understood. We argue that the world is better
characterized by multiple inefficiencies and multiple policy makers with vari-
ous objectives. Asking the policy question only in terms of optimal monetary
policy effectively turns the central bank into the residual claimant of all policy
and gives the other policymakers a free hand in pursuing their own goals. This
further worsens the tradeoffs faced by the central bank. The optimal monetary
policy literature and the optimal simple rules often labeled flexible inflation
targeting assign all of the cyclical policymaking duties to central banks. This
distorts the policy discussion and narrows the policy choices to a suboptimal
set. We highlight this issue and call for a broader thinking of optimal policies.
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1 Introduction
The debate on optimal policy mix is old and the current literature on welfare-based
optimal monetary policy is extensive. But these two literatures are fundamentally
different in that optimal monetary policy, as the name suggests, is an exclusively mon-
etary policy question, leaving no room for a policy mix. Sometime between the 1960s
and the period’s Mundell-Fleming model that allows asking fiscal and monetary policy
questions, to the 1990s and the current optimal monetary policy questions, many aca-
demic economists and policymakers coalesced around the view that monetary policy
is more nimble and hence better suited to address cyclical issues.
The focus on monetary policy has had the unintended consequence of justifying
the treatment of central banks as residual claimants of policy. That is, on top of their
usual mandate of controlling inflation, central banks are charged with all types of
cyclical policy duties not completely addressed by other policymakers. These range
from unemployment and financial stability to exchange rates and current account
deficits, even to economic inequality. The literature by and large views this favorably,
as central banks take the actions of other policymakers as given and internalize social
welfare. In this approach to optimal monetary policy, any economic variable that
enters the welfare function and is affected by interest rates receives a non-zero weight
in the optimal policy rule. This, in turn, justifies using monetary policy to address
that variable in practice.
Monetary policy trying to address too many objectives is hampered by two types
of problems in replicating the efficient allocation. The first one is well known: a single
policy instrument cannot be used to achieve multiple independent objectives. This
static concern is of course valid. But we also highlight a second, strategic problem
that arises in the presence of multiple policymakers.
To the extent that other policymakers have competing objectives, such as the
fiscal policymaker having a bias for increasing (or reducing) spending or the financial
regulator having a preferred level of regulation, they will engage in policies that worsen
the policy trade-offs for the central bank if they do not have to internalize outcomes.
Asking only the optimal monetary policy question assigns the full burden of welfare
maximizing policy to the central bank and effectively absolves the other policymakers
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of the consequences of their actions. In that case, they will engage in behavior that
will be welfare reducing and cannot be undone by monetary policy.
Our concern is that, especially in the last few years, central banks have become pol-
icymakers of last resort. Many central banks around the world try to control inflation
while also behaving as residual claimants of all macroeconomic policies. Unemploy-
ment or capital flow problems not addressed by fiscal policymakers, macroprudential
concerns not addressed by bank regulators and many other important policy issues
have become issues that central bankers talk about and act on. These issues are
certainly important, but central banks that effectively take them on as additional
mandates may not be socially optimal, as the policymakers better suited to address
various issues may be even less likely to act when the central bank is seen as the agent
responsible for the outcome.
This paper will therefore highlight the inefficiencies inherent in treating central
banks as policymakers of last resort, drawing attention to the facts that central banks
cannot effectively address all inefficiencies, and also that there will be more inefficien-
cies if other policymakers do not have to internalize the consequences of their actions.
2 The Only Game in Town
The literature on model consistent welfare functions and optimal policy that maxi-
mizes welfare begins with the seminal work of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). In
almost all of this literature, the policymaker is the central bank that sets the interest
rate to maximize welfare. Fiscal policy enters the picture only to the extent that the
steady state inefficiency due to monopoly power is corrected by a lump sum tax and
a subsidy so that welfare is analyzed around an efficient steady state. Thus, fiscal
policy is absent from cyclical policy analysis.
Unsurprisingly, in optimal monetary policy problems the interest rate responds
to all welfare relevant variables in the model. Hence, the literature finds that opti-
mal policy is to set interest rates to control a combination of inflation and the output
gap (Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Giannoni and Woodford (2002)) as well as ex-
change rates (Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2010)), house prices (Adam and Woodford
(2013)), macroprudential concerns (Smets (2014)), asset prices (Gali (2014)), and so
2
on. These papers are correct: if the only available policy tool is the interest rate, it
should be set to maximize social welfare and will therefore respond to all distortions
that are affected by monetary policy.
This result is implicit in the modeling choice that asks the optimal monetary pol-
icy question, rather than the optimal policy question. In actual policy analysis this
corresponds to the answer of the question “how should monetary policy behave if
no other policymaker is doing anything?” and indeed, there are times when this is
the relevant question. In the recent Global Financial Crisis and subsequent Great
Recession, many fiscal authorities either did not provide much stimulus or pursued
contractionary policies due to factors such as political paralysis or policymaker prefer-
ences for small governments and low debt stocks. In these cases, central banks began
to put more emphasis on output gap or employment to pick up the policy slack and
were subsequently criticized for not doing enough.
A particularly striking example of a central bank minding many competing ob-
jectives is Sweden, where monetary policy was used to counter household leveraging,
which required rising interest rates at a time of inflation below target and unemploy-
ment above NAIRU (Svensson (2014)). The question is not whether fast leveraging is
a policy concern–it may well be—but rather whether it should be a monetary policy
concern. To the extent that higher interest rates lower debt to income ratios, which
Svensson argues is not the case in Sweden, monetary policy can be used to lower
leverage but is a roundabout way that creates steep trade-offs. It may be more effi-
cient to use financial regulation to impose lower loan to value rates, for example. But
if such regulation is slow to be enacted, central banks often rise to the occasion and
use interest rates, perhaps because they are used to doing cyclical policy and can act
fast.
The Central Bank of Turkey (CBRT) similarly took on additional mandates in
multiple instances in the past few years (Akkaya and Gürkaynak (2012)). An inflation
targeter with lexicographic mandates that requires the inflation target to be met
before it can aid the government in other policy pursuits, the CBRT lowered policy
rates to discourage short term currency flows and help promote exports to aid in
closing the large current account deficit, at a time when inflation was above the
target. CBRT now mentions financial stability, growth, and exchange rates as well
as inflation when talking about policy objectives. Gürkaynak et al. (2015) show that
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at least partly as a result, the central bank’s reaction function has changed and it is
not the inflation fighter it used to be. Currency flows, exports and current account
deficit are of course all important policy objectives that affect social welfare. But
have these become relevant for monetary policy because other policymakers are slow
or hesitant to do their jobs or have competing objectives, or are other policymakers
pursuing competing objectives precisely because CBRT is taking the blame for the
undesirable outcomes?
The fact that central banks often have to sacrifice their inflation goals to pursue
other objectives is well known. Indeed, a substantial chorus of central bankers point
to the limits and challenges that arise when monetary policy takes on the role of
the residual claimant of macropolicy. Orphanides (2013) discusses the burdens on
monetary policy as central banks expand their focus and objectives to include em-
ployment, public-sector balance sheet support and financial stability. While monetary
policy can make attempts to address such issues, other tools are often more appropri-
ate. Inflation targeting frameworks, instead, may prove effective at limiting central
bank excursions into areas where the efficacy of interest rate policy is quite limited,
particularly when compared to instruments available to other policy authorities. Al-
though a primary motivation of the inflation targeting framework was adoption of a
nominal anchor, Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) describe the benefits more precisely
as bringing coherence, transparency and discipline to monetary policy. Disciplining
the central bank to focus on its narrow mandate is indeed important.
The main point we are making in this paper is that monetary policy is not the
only game in town and behaving as if it is creates more costs than may be commonly
perceived. When the central banks take on more policy mandates either explicitly
and willingly or implicitly and out of necessity, they are the ones to be criticized when
those objectives are unmet. In that case, other policymakers who wield instruments
that can more effectively address those objectives have less incentive to actively use
these instruments–they no longer internalize the cost of missing targets. This makes
the trade off for central banks even worse.
One way to re-think the examples presented above is through policymaker incen-
tives. As long as the ECB is seen as the only policymaker in the euro area and is
blamed for its ills, fiscal authorities in member countries do not have the right incen-
tive to pursue coordinated fiscal policies that will help prop up demand, or to engage
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in structural reforms that are costly in the short run. Or in Turkey, the government
can continue to pursue expansionary policies, stoking currency inflows and boosting
imports, while blaming the central bank for not doing enough to counter these as well
as for missing the inflation target (Gürkaynak (2015)).
While the literature on optimal monetary policy has been instrumental in ana-
lyzing normative questions, it also gave theoretical credence to the idea that central
banks are default cyclical policymakers and would pick up any policy slack. In a
vicious cycle, policymakers’ belief that “monetary policy is more nimble and is there-
fore more appropriate for cyclical policy” and the literature’s theoretical finding that
“optimal monetary policy should address all cyclical concerns” have fed off of each
other, turning monetary policy into the residual claimant of all macroeconomic policy.
It is, however, important to remember that we observe equilibrium outcomes.
Monetary policy has to be more nimble because it is used for cyclical dampening
purposes while fiscal (or other) policies can be slow because no one questions why
they are not designed and implemented faster. This is an artefact of the current
policy landscape and is a consequence of the implicit distribution of social loss among
various policymakers.
Clearly, it matters how the social welfare function is translated into mandates for
multiple policymakers. With a single policymaker, assuming away time inconsistency
problems, giving that policymaker maximization of social welfare as the mandate
will be optimal. However, with multiple policymakers, if one is maximizing social
welfare and others have free hands in pursuing their alternative goals, what will be
the welfare consequences? This question does not explicitly arise in the literature,
although it is of first order importance. Below we present a simple model to answer
it and highlight our concern about treating central banks as the default cyclical
macroeconomic policymaker.
3 General Framework
A few modifications to the benchmark New Keynesian model can highlight the tension
between policymakers and the temptation for monetary policy to assume primary re-
sponsibility for mitigating the cycle. First, the framework requires a policy instrument
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that is under the control of a non-monetary authority and enters the forward-looking
Phillips curve as follows
πt = βEtπt+1 + κxt + ψzt + εt, (1)
where πt represents the log deviation of inflation from its target, xt is the log deviation
of output from its level under flexible prices, and εt is a markup shock. The novel
aspect of the setup is zt, which represents a policy instrument outside of the control
of the central bank. As an example, the following section incorporates a value-added
tax applied to the monopolistically competitive goods producers within an otherwise
standard New Keynesian framework.1
The second modification includes an assumption that a monetary and a non-
monetary authority set their policy instruments independently. The following section
uses the example of a monetary and fiscal authority, exploring cases when each is
assigned objectives that maximize social welfare, as well as cases when each pursues
different objectives. The example assumes the fiscal authority takes the monetary
policy reaction function as given and sets the tax rate in a strategic manner. That
is, when setting the tax rate, the fiscal policymaker incorporates, or exploits, the
systematic response of monetary policy in a way that aids in achieving its objectives.
In contrast, the central bank takes the tax rate as a given exogenous factor, so does
not incorporate into its optimization problem how tax rates adjust to monetary policy.
In this small model, households’ behavior follows the standard New Keynesian
formulation given by the linearized consumption Euler equation
xt = Etxt+1 − σ−1 (it − Etπt+1) + ut, (2)
where it is the nominal interest rate and ut ∼ N (0, σ2u) can represent shocks to, for
example, government purchases or the household’s discount rate.
1See Krause and Lemke (2005) for a similar interpretation regarding the value-added tax.
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4 Achieving the Social Optimum via “Correct”
Policy Mandates
To illustrate these issues in the context of separate monetary and fiscal authorities,










In terms of the pricing behavior, the framework resembles a standard New Keynesian
model, except a value-added tax imposed on producers introduces an additional term
into the Phillips curve,
πt = βEtπt+1 + κxt + ψτt + εt, (4)
where τt is the instrument of the fiscal authority and εt ∼ N (0, σ2ε) reflects a shock
to the monopolistically competitive firms’ markup.2 Household consumption follows
(2) .
We can now think about welfare under two different policy mandates for the










In this case, monetary policy can offset any demand-side disturbance and adjust the
output gap in a manner that perfectly aligns inflation with its target. The solution




(εt + ψτt) + σut (6)
and results in the central bank meeting its mandate exactly by adjusting the output
gap according to xt = − 1κ (ψτt + εt) . This approach, however, is not the social opti-
mal, since welfare may be improved if the central bank is given the social loss function
2Details concerning equation (4) and derivations of all further results discussed in the main text
are relegated to the appendix.
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(εt + ψτt) + σut,
highlighting how the response to the supply-side disturbances declines as weight on
output gap stabilization, λS, increases.
When monetary policy aligns its objectives with society, neither objective is ex-
actly met, but social welfare is maximized. This is a manifestation of the general
critique of giving too many jobs to central banks. With a single policy tool, the
central bank cannot completely address multiple objectives. This standard dictum of
optimal control theory appears in the central banking literature repeatedly.
It is, however, the case that the central bank has indeed maximized social welfare
subject to its available policy tool and economic environment. This too is a standard
finding in the optimal policy literature. As in the case above, where the divine
coincidence does not hold in a world with cost-push shocks, the central bank faces
a trade-off between various objectives. The received wisdom is that confronting this
trade-off is still the optimal policy.
We disagree. Our disagreement is primarily because there exist first best tools
of addressing various inefficiencies in the economy and the interest rate is rarely, if
ever, that tool for inefficiencies other than welfare losses from inflation. Monetary
policy can certainly support demand and thereby aid in moving economies towards
full employment. Such efforts, however, often lead other policy authorities to neglect
implementing policies using more appropriate instruments. Efforts by monetary pol-
icy to compensate for the lack of urgency on the part of other policymakers may
even create vulnerabilities, such as in the financial system, that ultimately prove
counterproductive to achieving the social optimum.
To illustrate how a central bank’s focus on objectives other than price stability
can distort the incentives of other policymakers, consider the choice of τt under the
control of a fiscal authority. Label the loss function for this authority F and assume
it takes the central bank’s reaction function as given. If the central bank follows a
strict inflation targeting regime, as in (5), with the fiscal authority minimizing the
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directing it to use the instrument to fully offset the supply-side disturbance. This
result follows Benigno and Woodford (2003), where the optimal distorting tax rate
in a New Keynesian setting adjusts to perfectly offset the supply-side shock. The
central bank can then focus on offsetting demand-side disturbances in a manner that
completely stabilizes inflation.
This is the global minimum of the social loss and represents the case where two
separate policymakers are given “correct” mandates. That is, there exists two ap-
propriate policy control variables for two distortions. When these tools are optimally
employed, social loss is minimized at zero. Notice that in this case, neither policy-
maker had minimizing the social loss function as their mandates, but they jointly
achieve the global minimum of the social loss criterion.
5 Idiosyncratic Policy Objectives
The fact that giving a policymaker the maximization of social welfare may not be
optimal has been known since the work of Kydland and Prescott (1977) on time
inconsistency, but the mechanism we highlight is fundamentally different. Here the
problem is not that the central bank cannot commit to pursuing the policy it promises
today. In fact, the problem is that because the central bank will pursue the objec-
tive in a time-consistent manner, other policymakers are freed to pursue their own,
possibly more narrow, objectives. This is the key concern of this paper.
The issue arises when policymakers have terms in their loss function not contained
in the social objective function. Policy preferences unique to a particular policy
making body could reflect an array of factors outside social welfare. For example,
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desire for fiscal expansion or austerity, “inside” lags associated with challenges in
adjusting tax rates are factors that pertain to fiscal policy.3 If the central bank’s loss
function remains (5)–a pure inflation targeter–then these other concerns manifest
themselves by diminishing the extent to which the tax rate adjusts to offset the
supply-side shock.
To illustrate our case, modify the fiscal authority’s loss function to include other










which reflects a desire to keep the tax rate close to a target rate that the fiscal





reflecting how a fiscal authority placing relatively high weight on being close to the
target tax rate (i.e. relatively high λF ) makes only modest adjustments to the tax






If λF > 0, then the fiscal authority’s concern for some target level of tax rates results
in moving the equilibrium away from the social optimum. The stronger this concern,
the further the policy pulls the equilibrium away from the social optimum.
Instead of strict inflation targeting, if the central bank includes the output gap in




λF (κ2 + λCB)
xt, (10)
illustrating that if the central bank attaches weight to output fluctuations (λCB > 0),
even in a way that aligns its loss function with society (λCB = λS), the optimal fiscal
3These inside lags can also be thought of as equilibrium outcomes resulting from a game played
between policymakers rather than being purely exogenous. That is, if fiscal policy does not have to
be used for cyclical stabilization, it can afford to have inside lags.
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policy action is to reduce the sensitivity of its instrument to output fluctuations. In
other words, the fiscal authority lets the central bank worry about output, as it turns
focus to its other objective that is not included in social welfare. This dynamic is a
fundamental reason why optimal monetary policy may not entail directly confronting
the trade-off between the output gap and inflation.
In this setting, a key issue is whether given the social loss function (3), the central
bank moves outcomes closer to minimizing the social loss by following strict inflation
targeting, as in (5), or by adopting the social loss function, even though it may
provide an incentive to the fiscal authority to stay away from an active role in output



















κ2ψ + λF (κ2 + λS)2
)εt.
The following show how output and inflation move when the fiscal authority places














which would be the results in a basic New Keynesian model without the distorting
tax. This is the case where τ = 0 at all times and cyclical policy is carried out by
the central bank exclusively. This limiting case highlights how a monetary authority
willing to confront the trade-offs inherent in attempting to maximize social welfare
absolves the fiscal authority from stabilizing output fluctuations (or more broadly,
absolves other policymakers from addressing inefficiencies) that they can control.
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Still, the question remains under what conditions the monetary authority maxi-
mizes social welfare by pursuing pure inflation targeting, as opposed to adopting the
social loss function. To address this issue, we apply some conventional parameter













holds for various combinations of λS and λF .4 The right-hand side of the inequality
corresponds to the unconditional loss when the central bank uses the social welfare
function. The left-hand side also is the unconditional loss evaluated using social





the condition we check is









Consider first the case when the fiscal authority places relatively low weight on
the target tax rate, using its instrument relatively aggressively to offset supply-side
shocks. In this case, as is shown in Figure 1, the monetary authority can reinforce
this behavior by adopting pure inflation targeting, resulting in overall lower social
loss than if it were to adopt the social loss function. The intuition for this result
rests with equation (10), as it shows the fiscal authority will adjust the tax rate
more aggressively in response to output fluctuations if the central bank is primarily
focused on inflation. That is, the fiscal authority takes more ownership for output
stabilization and behaves accordingly. This results in a modest cost for the fiscal
authority, but inflicts no costs in the context of the social welfare objective. As a
result, an inflation targeting central bank shifts the burden of output stabilization
towards the fiscal authority, which has an effective instrument to stabilize output.
The combination under inflation targeting is overall welfare improving.
Alternatively, Figure 2 shows a case when the fiscal authority places more weight
on its tax smoothing objective. In this case, the fiscal authority is already too focused
on its own objective, so the central bank increases overall social loss by focusing
narrowly on strict inflation targeting. The fiscal authority is relatively too insensitive
4Parameter values are set as so the steady-state markup is 20% above marginal cost, the steady
state tax rate is τ = .1, σ = 1 and the cost of price adjustment is set so that κ = .1 in the scenario
with the relatively steep Phillips curve and κ = .05 in the case when it’s relatively flat.
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to output loss, so the central bank cannot provide a sufficient incentive to induce fiscal
policy to do what is socially desirable. By focusing heavily (or only) on inflation, the
central bank can again shift some of the burden of output stabilization to the fiscal
authority. But the action taken by the fiscal authority is not enough, from a social
welfare perspective, to justify the central bank not addressing the output gap itself.
To more broadly illustrate situations when pure inflation targeting is optimal, Fig-
ure 3 shows the trade-offs in optimal policy design. In cases where the fiscal authority
places relatively low weight on fiscal objectives outside of output stabilization (i.e. λF
is near zero), the central bank may raise social welfare via pure inflation targeting.
When the fiscal authority puts too little relative weight on output stabilization, she
cannot be incentivized enough to act to close the output gap, hence it is socially
desirable to have the central bank address both output gap and inflation.5
The desirability of strict inflation targeting also hinges on the structure of the
economy. Figure 4 shows conditions when strict inflation targeting is socially optimal
under a relatively flat Phillips curve. In this case, monetary policy needs to adjust the
output gap more forcefully to stabilize inflation. The additional volatility in output
induces welfare losses that, relative to economies with a steeper Phillips curve, often
makes strict inflation target welfare reducing. The exception, however, is when the
fiscal authority attaches little weight to its idiosyncratic objective, which then allows
for the clean separation of objectives and instruments.
While these examples take the objective functions of the two policymakers as
independent of each other, an alternative way of highlighting our concern is to think
of the social loss being shared by the two policymakers. For example, assume the

























5This of course assumes the relative weights of output gap and tax smoothing in the fiscal policy
maker’s loss function are exogenous. Below we discuss the case where the central bank and the
fiscal authority share the the loss from output gap so that when the central bank assumes less of
the output gap mandate, the fiscal policy maker assigns proportionately more weight to it.
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This approach explicitly builds in an understanding on the part of the fiscal authority
that the greater focus on the output mandate from the central bank (i.e. higher
settings for λCB) relative to society’s preference, the more the fiscal authority can
focus on its competing objective. In this formulation, the central bank adopting the
social loss function (λCB = λS) is clearly not in society’s best interest, as the fiscal
authority will then only care about its private objectives. On the other hand, if the
central bank does not volunteer for any output related mandates (λCB = 0), then
the entire loss due to output gap fluctuations is born by the fiscal authority, who in
this case follows socially optimal policies and unconditional welfare reaches its global
maximum.
Another implication of the above formulation is that the more weight society places
on output gap fluctuations, the more is to be gained if the monetary authority adopts
strict inflation targeting. Strict targeting would lead to a clean separation between
objectives and instruments of the two policymakers, since the fiscal authority would
focus on perfectly offsetting the disturbance to the Phillips curve, while monetary
policy can perfectly offset shocks impinging on the Euler equation. This separation
returns us to the initial arrangement were each policy authority is given “correct”
mandates.
In these examples, where a fiscal policymaker has private objectives, but also
cares sufficiently about social welfare, pure inflation targeting by the central bank
helps align the behavior of the fiscal authority with social preferences. Of course, as
we have seen, inflation targeting may not always be optimal. If the fiscal authority
places a substantial amount of weight on its own objectives, monetary policy simply
cannot get it to pay enough attention to relevant objects in the social welfare function,
such as output gap stabilization.
From this perspective, a fiscal policy that places high weight on factors not in-
cluded in the social loss function may reflect substantial “inside” lags. In practice,
Blinder (2006) discusses how such lags reflect the time between when fiscal policy-
makers acknowledge the need for some action and the time it takes for policies to be
implemented. In terms of the model, inside lags may appear to reflect a preferred
tax rate, but in practice may capture the challenges associated with implementing
fiscal reforms due to political considerations, or administrative time required to dis-
burse funds and change tax withholding schedules. Interpreted this way, preferred
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tax rates would reflect exogenous constraints on the fiscal authority and not socially
undesirable private concerns.
Whether such lags, or other ancillary policymaker concerns are exogenous or en-
dogenous matters. We are used to thinking of central banks as the cyclical policymak-
ers because of the slowness in implementing fiscal policy changes. However, this may
be the observed result of the game between policymakers, rather than a constraint
imposed by nature. One can imagine an alternative environment where the central
bank moves slowly due to the long and variable lags of monetary policy effectiveness,
and fiscal policy is nimble because someone has to address the cyclical policy needs.
While large inside lags for fiscal policy may call for a monetary policy that does
adopt the social welfare loss, clearly an endogeneity issue arises. If the lags are
endogenous, monetary policy attempting to address all cyclical concerns may not
motivate other policymakers to address the road blocks that generate such inside
lags. As a result, the fiscal authority’s advantage is strengthened from the standpoint
of being able to pay less attention to shocks, since they will be addressed by monetary
policy, and allow it to shift weight towards its own particular objectives.6
While we make our point in a simple, stylized model, the point is very general.
The world is a multiple objective, multiple policymaker world. Policy makers have
their own objectives and behave strategically. If one policymaker volunteers for the
responsibility for multiple objectives, either due to the desire to be more important or
due to lack of appropriate policies from other policymakers, the equilibrium outcomes
may be suboptimal by the social welfare metric.
6 Discussion
The argument in this paper is motivated by a macroeconomic policy concern. If
policy makers do not sufficiently internalize the welfare effects of their actions, in
particular if another policymaker is seen as responsible for those outcomes, then they
may choose socially suboptimal policies.
6“First mover advantage” and “leader/follower” are terminology of sequential games. While the
model we present is technically not sequential, the analogy is apt. We will turn to the sequential
game analogy again in the general discussion below.
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As a recent example from the US, aggressive monetary actions from the Federal
Reserve, both in terms of balance sheet policies and forward guidance, were tailored
toward concerns about improving labor market conditions, though within a context
of price stability. During such actions, however, fiscal policy underwent a significant
tightening. For example, an estimate from the Brookings Institute has fiscal policy
restraining real GDP growth by about 1 percentage point starting in 2011 through
2014.7 While it is difficult to determine whether fiscal policies would have been
different if US monetary policy had been less accommodative, monetary policy actions
certainly incorporated the weight tighter fiscal policy was exerting on the outlook.
The FOMC statement from June 2013, for example, explicitly states that “fiscal policy
is restraining growth.” A monetary policy mandated to pursue both price stability
and full employment, as is the Federal Reserve, may not have many alternatives in the
face of such fiscal restraint. The question posed in this paper is whether such fiscal
restraint would arise under the understanding by fiscal authorities that the central
bank would not undertake easier policy to compensate.
We think of this as a general policy concern of increasing importance, as central
banks are trying to address ever increasing loads of policy burdens. The model
we presented above suggests that assigning the social welfare as the mandate to the
central bank may not be optimal as it may distort the incentives of other policymakers.
There are several ways to interpret our argument and tie it to the literature.
An obvious starting point is time inconsistency (Kydland and Prescott (1977)).
While time inconsistency is effectively a game the central bank plays with the public
(and its future self) over time, here we have a game between multiple policymakers
within a single period. In this sense our work is closer to that of Dixit and Lambertini
(2003) who study monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a time inconsistency
setting. Although the mechanisms are different, the understanding is similar, the
game entails strategic behavior of policymakers and given strategic behavior it may
be optimal not to give the central bank social welfare as the objective. In fact,
Rogoff (1985) had shown that a central banker who puts more weight (than social
welfare does) on inflation maximizes welfare. Here we show that a central banker
who puts similarly high weight on inflation again maximizes welfare, not by making
the public take the socially desirable decision, but by making the other policymakers
7See http://www.brookings.edu/research/interactives/2014/fiscal-barometer.
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take socially desirable actions.
Another way of thinking of our argument is in terms of a sequential game. This
is technically not correct in the context of the model we presented (the model is si-
multaneous), but the analogy is helpful. One may as well think of the setting where
a policymaker moves first and a second policymaker moves next, trying to maximize
its objective. If one of these policymakers has distortionary terms in her objective
function, it may be preferable to shift the social welfare burden to that policymaker
(make that policymaker move last) so that the relative weight of the distortion in
her decision making is minimized. Whether this would improve welfare depends on
how sensitive the other policymaker will be to this incentive, as discussed in section
5. In general, who goes first matters. A setting where fiscal policy moves last leaves
the central bank with a different, and likely socially worse, set of constraints. Con-
sequently, central banks need to remain attuned to how their policies and objectives
may spill over into actions of other policy agencies before accepting the job of policy-
maker of last resort. Given the nature of the game, inflation targeting is the preferable
approach either when society places relatively high weight on price stability or the
non-monetary policy agency places sufficiently high weight on output stabilization.
In this sense, our results are bolstered by those of Walsh (2015), who considers
the optimality of flexible inflation targeting when a central bank is pursuing multiple
objectives. His concern is not interactions among multiple policymakers, nonetheless,
in many circumstances, he shows strict inflation targeting comes remarkably close
to maximizing social welfare. This result may be due to small welfare costs that
arise from non-inflation objectives, such as exchange rate volatility or fluctuations in
unemployment; or, fluctuations in non-inflation objectives may create welfare costs,
but monetary policy is not the most effective instrument to address the distortions.
Similarly, in Ravenna and Walsh (2012), a steady-state inefficiency exists in the labor
market that requires a relatively large tax to correct, hence is not something monetary
policy can effectively address. Any attempt to use monetary policy to offset this
inefficiency creates an unfavorable trade-off for monetary policy that generates welfare
losses relative to strict inflation targeting. We have a fundamentally different policy
focus and mechanism in mind, but see these results as supporting our view that in
many circumstances giving the central bank too broad a mandate may be suboptimal.
The example we worked with in this paper is a game between the monetary and
17
fiscal policymakers. This can be thought of as a fiscal dominance story. Although
more prevalent in the emerging markets literature, fiscal dominance has a long history
in the analysis of advanced economies as well, leading to the fiscal theory of the price
level. In work most relevant for our argument, building on the framework of Leeper
(1991), Davig and Leeper (2011) illustrate that competing policy choices can be forced
to a head if an economy reaches its fiscal limit, which is the point where tax rates
can no longer rise and government purchases can no longer be reduced to stabilize
debt dynamics. At this point, either transfer payments to households must be cut,
the fiscal authority defaults on its outstanding debt or monetary policy capitulates by
doing whatever it takes to stabilize debt dynamics, which is to allow higher inflation.
Thus, the scenario applies to debt-laden countries that have hit the limit of their
borrowing capacity and are faced with difficult choices. A credible inflation targeting
regime can take the monetary policy solution off the table, forcing the fiscal authority’s
hand to make adjustments that result in stabilizing debt prior to facing the immediate
and painful policy choices that are only available at the fiscal limit. Opening the door
to a monetary solution, however, can incentivize the fiscal authority to postpone
choices that result in rising debt levels, leading to socially suboptimal equilibria,
similar to what we observe in our model.
The examples have all been couched in terms of competing domestic policy au-
thorities, though they also pertain to international monetary policy coordination.
Consider a two-country model where one policymaker cares about global welfare and
the other cares only about national welfare. The second policymaker may feel com-
pelled to undertake beggar-thy-neighbor policies that cannot be undone by the first
policymaker. Of course, not all international policy games are examples for our
argument–it is not surprising that countries may strategically engage in competitive
devaluations which reduce global welfare, for example. A good open economy exam-
ple for our case is the lender of last resort function of the IMF, which is presumably
trying to maximize global welfare but may also be providing a moral hazard problem
for the policymakers of the countries that can count on IMF loans when things go
badly (Bulow and Rogoff (1988)).
While we focus on an issue with clear policy relevance, the policy advice arising
from our argument is not obvious. The examples in the paper suggest that a natural
division of policy labor is for the central bank to care about inflation, leaving the other
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policy authorities to focus on objectives well-suited to their instruments. Key to our
argument is that if the central bank takes on additional mandates, other policymakers
may face incentives not in line with social welfare, hence central bank mandate creep
may be welfare detrimental. However, this does not answer the question of how to
move to the good equilibrium if a country is stuck in the bad one.
If other policymakers are behaving socially suboptimally, it would entail a very
large welfare cost if the central bank does not try to maximize social welfare to induce
those policymakers to move to the good policy equilibrium. This is a general problem
in too-big-to-fail situations, where the problem is best solved before it arises and the
policy options are limited once the choice is between allowing catastrophe now and
providing bad incentives for the future.
7 Conclusions
The optimal macroeconomic policy literature focuses on monetary policy and espe-
cially during the recent crisis monetary policy became the policy tool to address all
economic ailments. While it is clearly optimal for monetary policy to pick up policy
slack if other policymakers are not doing their jobs for various reasons, we highlight
the problem that this makes it easier and more likely for those other policymakers
not to do their jobs. We should be cognizant of this cost of equating optimal policy
with optimal monetary policy.
While we point out the problem, we are short of offering a solution. Monetary
policy not behaving as the policymaker of last resort and allowing a sizable welfare
loss to incentivize other policymakers to do their jobs is a very costly way of re-
aligning policymaker mandates. We see highlighting the problem as the first step.
Hopefully thinking about ways to alleviate it will follow.
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A Appendix
A.1 Households and Monopolistically Competitive Firms un-
der a Value-Added Tax




























where Ct denotes real consumption, Bt nominal bonds, Pt the price level, Tt lump-
sum taxes, or rebate, Wt nominal wages, Nt labor supply, it the nominal interest rate








Linearization of the households optimality condition for consumption yields (2).
















Yit = AtNit, (A.5)









is the quadratic cost of price adjustment. The government runs a period-by-period
balanced budget, so rebates all proceeds from the tax back to households via a lump-
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where Π is the steady-state inflation rate and Φt is real marginal cost. The firm’s
first-order condition is given by





































which after imposing a symmetric equilibrium, so Pit = Pt, can be rewritten as follows






















where Πt = Pt/Pt−1. Steady-state marginal costs are given by
Φ =
(ε− 1) (1− τt)
ε
and the linearized Phillips curve is
π̂t = βEtπ̂t+1 +






where φ̂t ≡ log Φt − log Φ, π̂t ≡ log Πt − log Π, and τ̂t ≡ log τt − log τ . Variables
without time subscripts denote steady-state values.
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A.2 Flexible Price Equilibrium
If prices are fully flexible, the desired price would be a constant markup, θ, over real


























To then express the linearized Phillips curve (A.7) in terms of an output gap, first












and write in log deviations from its steady state,




where x̂t ≡ logXt− logX. Using this relation with the linearized production function






(1− τ) (σ + µ)
τ̂t, (A.11)
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where ŷft is the log deviation of output under fully flexible prices. Rewriting (A.10)
allowing for time-varying markups yields








= (σ + µ) ŷt − (1 + µ) ât







(1− τ) (σ + µ)
τ̂t
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which allows the Phillips curve relation to be rewritten in terms of a flexible price
output gap,
π̂t = βEtπ̂t+1 +
(ε− 1) (1− τ)
ν









A.3 Optimal Policy Under “Correct” Objectives
When the monetary authority is a pure inflation targeter, the optimal interest rate





πt = βEtπt+1 + κxt + ψτt + εt,
where expectations are taken as given, so the policy reflects discretion in the sense
that the central bank is not committing to a future course of action (but note that
neither the social loss function nor any central bank loss function in our model will lead
to time inconsistency under discretion). The problem provides a standard reaction







To express this rule in terms of the interest rate, substitute back into the consumption




(εt + ψτt) + σut, (A.13)
where the central bank takes the tax rate as given when setting policy.





xt = Etxt+1 − σ−1 (it − Etπt+1) + ut, (A.14)
















The important difference between the monetary and fiscal authority’s problems is
that monetary policy takes τt as given, whereas the fiscal authority incorporates the
interest rate response into how it sets τt.
A.4 Optimal Policy Under Idiosyncratic Objectives





F τ 2t .
After substituting in the consumption Euler equation and the central bank’s optimal











+ λF τ 2t ,
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+ λF τ 2t ,
so the first-condition is then
τt =
κψ
λF (κ2 + λS)
xt. (A.16)
A.5 Equilibrium under strict inflation targeting
When the central bank follows a strict inflation target and the fiscal authority has
some preference for a target tax rate, the complete setting is given by
xt = Etxt+1 − σ−1 (it − Etπt+1)








(εt + ψτt) + σut
To compute the solution, guess it takes the following form
xt = cxεt, πt = cπεt, τt = cτεt, it = ciεt.
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A.6 Equilibrium when the central bank adopts the social
welfare function as its objective
When the central bank minimizes social loss and the fiscal authority has some pref-
erence for a target tax rate, the complete setting is given by
xt = Etxt+1 − σ−1 (it − Etπt+1)
πt = βEtπt+1 + κxt + ψτt + εt
τt =
κψ






To compute the solution, guess it takes the following form
xt = cxεt, πt = cπεt, τt = cτεt, it = ciεt.
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Central bank uses social welfare function when setting policy
Central bank is a strict inflation targeter
Figure 1: Social loss under a fiscal authority that places relatively low weight on
hitting a target tax rate (λCB = .5, λF = .001).
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Central bank uses social welfare function when setting policy
Central bank is a strict inflation targeter
Figure 2: Social loss under a fiscal authority places relatively high weight on a target
tax rate (λCB = .5, λF = .01).
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Figure 3: Monetary-Fiscal tradeoffs under relatively steep Phillips curve (κ = .1):
The shaded area represents conditions when social welfare is higher under a pure
inflation targeting regime.
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Figure 4: Monetary-Fiscal tradeoffs under relatively flat Phillips curve(κ = .05): The
shaded area represents conditions when social welfare is higher under a pure inflation
targeting regime.
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